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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
 William Eshleman appeals the District Court’s grant of 
Patrick Industries’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the suit 
Eshleman filed after Patrick Industries fired him.  Eshleman 
claimed that Patrick Industries regarded him as disabled in 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the 
3 
 
ADA)1 because he took two months of medical leave for a 
lung biopsy procedure and two vacation days for an upper 
respiratory infection.  The District Court held that the ADA 
did not cover Eshleman’s “regarded as” claim because his 
impairment lasted less than six months and was therefore 
“transitory and minor.”  As we explain in more detail below, 
because the District Court did not conduct an independent 
analysis into whether Eshleman’s impairment was minor, 
apart from whether it was transitory, we will reverse and 




According to the First Amended Complaint,2 
Eshleman started working as a truck driver for Patrick 
Industries in July 2013.3 Between October 14, 2015 and 
December 14, 2015, Eshleman took medical leave to undergo 
surgery to remove a nodule from his left lung.4 He told his 
supervisor that the nodule had to be removed and tested for 
cancer.5 After two months of medical leave, Eshleman 
returned to work in his full capacity, without restrictions.6 
However, about six weeks later, Eshleman suffered a severe 
 
1 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.  
2 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007) (“[A] 
judge ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint 
‘must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in 
the complaint.’”) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 
U.S. 506, 508, n. 1 (2002)). 
3 A26.  
4 A27.  
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
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respiratory infection lasting from January 27, 2016 until 
January 31, 2016.7 His supervisor approved two vacation 
days during this time.8 With his physician’s approval, 
Eshleman returned to work in his full capacity on February 1, 
2016.9 At the end of his shift on his second day back, Patrick 
Industries fired him.10 
The Superintendent where Eshleman worked told 
Eshleman he was terminated due to “performance issues.”11 
However, Eshleman reminded the Superintendent that his 
performance review from early January 2016 had been 
excellent, with all 4.5’s and one five out of a possible five in 
each category evaluated.12 Thereafter, the Superintendent 
claimed that Eshleman was fired because he had not called 
out sick during his recent leave for the upper respiratory 
infection.13 Later, Eshleman learned that the reason for his 
termination had been changed yet again and the employer was 
claiming he had been fired for “behavioral issues.”14  
As we noted at the outset, Eshleman sued Patrick 
Industries alleging that the real reason for his termination was 
that he was regarded as disabled in violation of the ADA and 
that the shifting reasons for his termination were merely a 
pretext for illegal disability discrimination.15 According to 
 
7 Id.  
8 Id. January 30 and 31 may not have not counted as workdays 
as they fell on a Saturday and Sunday.  
9 Id. 
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id.  
14 A28.  
15 Id.  
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Eshleman, Patrick Industries fired him because they 
“perceived that [Eshleman] suffered from [a] long-term or 
chronic medical condition which would affect his attendance 
in the future, like it had in the immediate past, due to what 
they perceived as continuing medical issues.”16 He claims 
that Patrick Industries, based solely on his recent record of 
medical issues and the resulting nine-and-a-half  weeks of 
work that he missed in a fifteen week period because of his 
lung biopsy and respiratory infection, concluded that he “was 
unreliable, a liability, and unable to perform a wide range of 
jobs.”17  
 
B. The ADA  
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibits 
covered entities from discriminating against qualified 
employees based on their disabilities. 18 To state a claim 
under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) [s/]he is a 
disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) [s/]he is 
otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the 
job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the 
employer; and (3) [s/]he has suffered an otherwise adverse 
employment decision as a result of discrimination.”19 For the 
purposes of the ADA, plaintiffs are disabled if they: (1) have 
 
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 42 U.S.C. § 12112; see also Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. 
Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 755 (3d Cir. 2004), superseded 
on other grounds by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 6, 122 Stat. 3553, 3558. 
19 Taylor v. Phoenixville School Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (citing Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 
576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998)).  
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“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more” of their “major life activities”; (2) have “a record of 
such an impairment”; or (3) are “regarded as having such an 
impairment.”20 
Eshleman claims that Patrick Industries fired him 
because the company regarded him as disabled in violation of 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) based on his medically required 
absences. A plaintiff states a “regarded as” claim if s/he 
“establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action 
prohibited under [the ADA] because of an actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment 
limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”21 An 
employer regards a person as disabled when it 
“misinterpret[s] information about an employee’s limitations 
to conclude that the employee is incapable of performing” his 
or her job requirements.22 The ADA includes “regarded as” 
claims because being perceived as disabled “may prove just 
as disabling” to a person as another type of physical or mental 
impairment.23 
However, the ADA limits “regarded as” claims by 
excluding “impairments that are transitory and minor.”24 
Accordingly, if the perceived disability is “transitory and 
minor,” a plaintiff cannot state a “regarded as” discrimination 
 
20 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).  
21 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). 
22 Ross v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 347 F. Supp 2d. 200, 204 
(E.D. Pa. 2004) (citing Rinehimer v. Cemocolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 
375, 381 (3d Cir. 2002)).  
23 Williams, 380 F.3d at 774. 
24 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). 
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claim.25 The ADA defines “transitory” as “an impairment 
with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less,” but 
does not define “minor.”26 The District Court concluded that 
the face of Eshleman’s complaint fell within this exception 
and therefore dismissed his suit under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  
The District Court relied on “the temporal proximity 
between Mr. Eshleman’s medical absences and his 
termination…to support an inference that Patrick Industries 
regarded [him] as disabled” and concluded that Eshleman 
sufficiently pled a “regarded as” claim under the ADA.27 
Nevertheless, the court dismissed the complaint with leave to 
amend for failure to state a claim because the court held that 
the “[c]omplaint lacks any proof that his surgery and severe 
 
25 A22. See also Budhun v. Reading Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 765 
F.3d 245, 259 (3d Cir. 2014) (“While ordinarily a party may 
not raise affirmative defenses at the motion to dismiss stage, it 
may do so if the defense is apparent on the face of the 
complaint”) (internal citations omitted). Following the 
EEOC’s lead, our caselaw has sometimes described the 
limitation on “transitory and minor” impairments as an 
“affirmative defense.” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f)). We 
think this is imperfect shorthand, since the statutory text 
demands a non-transitory or non-minor perceived impairment 
for regarded-as claims. Put differently, a regarded-as plaintiff 
alleging a transitory and minor impairment has failed to state a 
legally sufficient claim, even if the employer does not include 
a transitory and minor defense in its Answer.  
26 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). 
27 A25.  
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upper respiratory infection were anything but transitory and 
minor.”28 
The Amended Complaint included additional 
information about the nature and purpose of Eshleman’s 
medical leave but did not negate the transitory and minor 
exception.  Accordingly, the District Court granted Patrick 
Industries’ motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint.29 
In doing so, it reiterated that Eshleman had pled a plausible 
“regarded as” claim.  However, relying upon our decision in 
Budhun v. Reading Hospital and Medical Center,30 the 
District Court held that Eshleman’s alleged impairment was 
objectively transitory and minor because “the actual or 
expected duration…lasted less than six months.”31 This 
appeal followed.32 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 Eshleman argues that the District Court committed two 
errors in dismissing his complaint.  He alleges that the 
District Court failed to consider whether his actual 
impairment—lung surgery to remove a nodule and test it for 
cancer—was non-minor.33 He also claims the District Court 
 
28 Id.  
29 A6.  
30 765 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 2014).  
31 A14.  
32 The District Court had jurisdiction over Eshleman’s ADA 
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291, we exercise plenary review of the District Court’s grant 
of a motion dismiss. See Finkelman v. Nat. Football League, 
877 F.3d 504, 510 (3d Cir. 2017); Pearson v. Sec’y Dep’t of 
Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 2015). 
33 Pet. Br. at 6. 
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failed to address whether the impairment that Patrick 
Industries perceived—described in Eshleman’s complaint as 
“continuing medical issues”—was transitory and minor.34  
We agree that the issue of whether an impairment is “minor” 
is a separate and distinct inquiry from whether it is 
“transitory.” We will therefore reverse and remand to the 
District Court to consider whether Eshleman’s impairment is 
minor based upon the allegations in his complaint. 
 
A. Pleading Standard 
At the motion to dismiss stage, before the plaintiff has 
had the benefit of discovery, all that is required is “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to 
relief.”35 However, the complaint “must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that 
is plausible on its face.’”36 A claim is plausible when the facts 
alleged “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference 
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”37 
As noted earlier, the District Court held that Eshleman 
pled sufficient facts to state a “regarded as” claim under the 
ADA. That determination is not challenged on appeal; 
therefore, we address only whether Eshleman’s complaint 
sufficiently alleges a regarded-as impairment that is not 




34 Id. at 7. 
35 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).   
36 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)).  
37 Id.; see also Burtch v. Milberg Factors, 662 F.3d 212, 220-
21 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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B. Transitory and Minor 
While Eshleman concedes that his actual 
impairments—surgery to remove a nodule from his lung and 
a severe upper respiratory infection—were transitory because 
they lasted less than six months, he argues that the District 
Court was nonetheless required to separately evaluate 
whether his impairment was “minor.” We agree. 
In carving out “transitory and minor” impairments 
from “regarded as” claims, the ADA specifically defines 
“transitory” as “an impairment with an actual or expected 
duration of 6 months or less.”38 The ADA does not, however, 
apply this definition to minor. While the statute is silent on 
the meaning of “minor,” the ADA regulations clearly state 
that an employer must establish that the perceived impairment 
is objectively both transitory and minor.39 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.15(f) states: “To establish this defense, a covered entity 
must demonstrate that the impairment is both ‘transitory’ and 
‘minor.’ Whether the impairment at issue is or would be 
‘transitory and minor’ is to be determined objectively.”40 
The regulations, like the statute, define “transitory” as 
“lasting or expected to last six months or less” but similarly 
do not extend this definition to “minor.”41 In addition, the 
regulations refer to the time limitation as “[t]he six-month 
‘transitory’ part of the ‘transitory and minor’ exception,” 
making absolutely clear the distinction between “transitory” 
and “minor.”42 It is therefore clear under the ADA regulations 
 
38 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). 
39 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f). 
40 Id. (emphasis added).  
41 Id. (“For purposes of this section, ‘transitory’ is defined as 
lasting or expected to last six months or less.”).  
42 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(ix).  
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that  “transitory” is just one part of the two prong “transitory 
and minor” exception.  
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 
interpretive guidance provides further justification for treating 
transitory and minor as separate and distinct components of 
the “transitory and minor” exception.43 The EEOC once again 
states that the “transitory and minor” exception requires a 
showing that the impairment is both transitory and minor, and 
clarifies that the six-month time limit applies only to the 
“transitory” prong of the exception.44 Furthermore, the EEOC 
provides the following illustration distinguishing between 
transitory and minor impairments: 
 
For example, an individual who is denied a promotion 
because he has a minor back injury would be 
“regarded as” an individual with a disability if the back 
impairment lasted or was expected to last more than 




43 Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. (2016).  
44 Id. at App. § 1630.15(f) (“[The ADA] explains that an 
individual cannot be ‘regarded as having such an impairment’ 
if the impairment is both transitory (defined by the ADAAA as 
lasting or expected to last less than six months) and minor.”). 
In another section, the EEOC explains that “the regulations 
provide an exception to coverage under the ‘regarded as’ prong 
where the impairment on which a prohibited action is based is 
both transitory (having an actual or expected duration of six 
months or less) and minor.” Id. at App. § 1630.2(I).  
45 Id.  
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According to the EEOC, the minor back injury lasting longer 
than six months is not “transitory and minor” because it meets 
only the “minor” prong of the exception but is not transitory. 
The converse must also be true; an impairment that is 
transitory because it lasts less than six months but is 
objectively non-minor must also fall outside the “transitory 
and minor” exception.  
Finally, excluding only impairments that are both 
transitory and minor is consistent with Congress’ intent to 
expand ADA coverage through the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008.46 As the House Judiciary Committee Report on the 
ADAAA explains, when including “regarded as” claims 
under the ADA “Congress did not expect or intend that this 
would be a difficult standard to meet.”47 The Report further 
explains that the “transitory and minor” exception was 
intended to weed out only “claims at the lowest end of the 
spectrum of severity,” such as “common ailments like the 
cold or flu,” and that the exception “should be construed 
narrowly.”48 Treating transitory and minor as separate and 
distinct elements is therefore consistent with the intent to 
afford broad coverage under the “regarded as” provision.  
The District Court relied heavily on our decision in 
Budhun to justify dismissing Eshleman’s claim. However, the 
District Court’s analysis improperly conflated “transitory” 
and “minor” by mechanically applying the six-month 
limitation for “transitory” claims to the definition of 
 
46 H.R. Rep. No. 110–730 pt. 2, at 5 (2008) (“The purpose of 
[the ADAA] is to restore protection for the broad range of 
individuals with disabilities as originally envisioned by 
Congress”). 
47 Id. at 17. 
48 Id. at 18. 
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“minor.”49 In Budhun, we held that an employee’s broken 
pinky finger, which resulted in her losing the use of three 
fingers for two months, was objectively transitory and 
minor.50 Budhun broke the bone connecting her wrist to her 
pinky finger and that finger was taped to her adjoining ring 
and middle fingers in order to stabilize it.51  Despite her 
broken finger, Budhun insisted that she could nevertheless 
still perform her primary work function of typing, just “‘not 
as fast as [she] used to . . .’”52 Her treating physician initially 
estimated that Budhun’s “period of incapacity [would be] 
‘08/02/10 – 08/16/10’” or fourteen days.53 Thus, on its face, 
given Budhun’s own account of her injury and request for 
leave and her physician’s initial estimate of the amount of 
time required for full recovery and return to work with no 
restrictions, her injury could fairly be deemed to be both 
transitory and minor. 
Budhun alleged, and her employer perceived, “a 
broken bone in her hand and nothing more,” and Budhun 
conceded the lost use of her fingers was only temporary.54 
Thus, the temporary nature of a broken pinky finger served as 
a proxy for the lack of severity. Although our discussion in 
Budhun could be read as suggesting any impairment with an 
 
49 A14 (“[T]he actual or expected duration of Mr. Eshleman’s 
impairment lasted less than six months making it transitory and 
minor.”); Resp. Br. at 9 (“Transitory and minor impairments 
are defined as those with an expected duration of six months or 
less.”).  
50 Budhun, 765 F.3d at 259-60. 
51 Id. at 248. 
52 Id. 
54 Id. at 249. 
54 Id. at 259-60. 
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“actual or expected duration of six months or less” is 
necessarily “transitory and minor,” the discussion must be 
viewed in the context of Budhun’s objectively non-serious 
pinky injury, as well as the allegedly short recovery time. 
Accordingly, Budhun should not be interpreted as imposing a 
rigid six-month-or-more requirement on establishing 
“regarded as” claims.  
Consequently, the District Court erred by not 
considering whether Eshelman’s impairment was objectively 
minor separately from whether it was transitory.   The term 
“minor” is not defined in statute, and instead of formulating a 
broad definition of that term, courts have approached the 
issue on a case-by-case basis.  Here, the District Court should 
have considered such factors as the symptoms and severity of 
the impairment, the type of treatment required, the risk 
involved, and whether any kind of surgical intervention is 
anticipated or necessary—as well as the nature and scope of 
any post-operative care. A broken pinky finger, treated with a 
splint, is hardly comparable to surgically removing a lung 
nodule. The latter involves surgery on a vital organ (which is, 
by definition, an invasive procedure) and all the risks and 
post-operative care this inevitably entails. And that is true 
even if the impairment has an anticipated recovery time of 
two months and is therefore “transitory.” Because even 
minimally invasive lung surgery is still thoracic surgery, more 
than likely requiring inpatient care, it is plausible that 
Eshleman’s lung surgery was non-minor. 
 Moreover, Eshleman’s case is further distinguishable 
from Budhun, because there it was “abundantly clear that [the 
employer] considered Budhun to have a broken bone in her 
hand and nothing more.”55  In contrast, Eshleman alleges that 
 
55 Id. at 259.  
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Patrick Industries perceived his recent medical issues to 
signify an on-going health condition.56 We noted in Budhun 
that “[n]owhere in the complaint does Budhun allege that [her 
employer] thought her injury was anything other than a 
broken fifth metacarpal.”57 Eshleman’s complaint, on the 
other hand, alleges that it was the lung surgery coupled with a 
severe respiratory infection – close-in-time ailments affecting 
the same system of the body – that led to his employer to 
perceive him as disabled. That situation is unlike the 
employer in Budhun, who thought the employee would be 
fully recovered in less than two months.58 We therefore 
disagree with the District Court’s contention that “nowhere 
does Mr. Eshleman plead Patrick Industries understood his 
impairment to be anything other than a one-time surgery . . 
.”59 Eshleman’s complaint contains plausible allegations that 
Patrick Industries regarded his series of recent medically-
related absences as signs of a continuing medical condition 
that essentially rendered him damaged goods and therefore 
unemployable. The District Court failed to evaluate whether 
 
56 A28.  
57 Budhun, 765 F.3d at 260. 
58 In disagreeing with this statement, we do not suggest that 
“a one-time surgery” is inevitably minor. The severity of the 
underlying disability cannot depend upon the frequency of the 
required surgical intervention.  We do not need expert 
testimony to appreciate that a very serious medical condition 
may nevertheless require only a single surgical procedure. 
Organ transplants are, perhaps, the best example of this.  
59 A13.  
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Eshleman’s perceived chronic medical condition, distinct 
from his lung surgery, was objectively transitory and minor.60 
Patrick Industries points to several instances where 
district courts have found that impairments allegedly similar 
to Eshleman’s lung surgery were “transitory and minor,” none 
of which we find persuasive.61 Not only are these unreported 
and mainly out-of-Circuit cases not binding on this Court, 
they also largely fail to make distinct findings about whether 
the impairments are both “transitory” and “minor.”62 In 
 
60 See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. at § 1630.2(I) (2016) (“[A]n 
employer that terminated an employee with an objectively 
‘transitory and minor’ hand wound, mistakenly believing it to 
be symptomatic of HIV infection, will nevertheless have 
‘regarded’ the employee as an individual with a disability, 
since the covered entity took a prohibited employment action 
based on a perceived impairment (HIV infection) that is not 
‘transitory and minor.’); see also H.R. Rep. No. 110–730 Pt. 2, 
at 17 (2008) (“This third, ‘regarded as,’ prong was meant to 
express Congress’s understanding that unfounded concerns, 
mistaken beliefs, fear, or prejudice about disabilities are just as 
disabling as actual impairments and its corresponding desire to 
prohibit discrimination founded on such concerns or fears.”). 
61 Resp. Br. at 19-20.  
62 Bachir v. Suburban Collection Imported Cars, LLC, No. 
17-13323, 2018 WL 4637324, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 
2018) (“To qualify as a disability under the regarded-as-
disabled prong of the ADA, a condition must last more than 
six months . . . Plaintiff has not alleged, much less produced 
evidence sufficient to show, that the mass on his throat 
afflicted him for more than six months.”); Santiago v. 
Urology Grp. of Princeton, P.A., No. 3:17-CV-4927, 2018 
WL 3472629, at *3 (D. N.J. July 19, 2018) (finding that 
17 
 
contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Silk 
v. Board of Trustees, Moraine Valley Community College 
made clear that the limitation on impairments lasting or 
expected to last less than six months applies to “transitory,” 
whereas the statute leaves “minor” undefined.63 There, the 
Seventh Circuit found that “a heart condition severe enough 
to require triple bypass surgery” was not on its face both 
transitory and minor.64 Consistent with the language and 
 
fifteen weeks of medical leave for spinal surgery “falls short 
of the six months necessary to show an injury is not 
objectively ‘transitory and minor’ . . .”); Weisel v. Stericycle 
Commc'ns Sols., No. 3:13-CV-3003, 2015 WL 390954, at *10 
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2015) (“Plaintiff's release to return to work 
two weeks after surgery is evidence that her condition was 
minor and of limited duration.”); Butler v. Advance/Newhouse 
P'ship, No. 6:11-CV-1958-ORL-28GJK, 2013 WL 1233002, 
at *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2013) (finding that back surgery 
and recovery time is “transitory and minor” because “[t]here 
is no evidence that anyone . . . expected the duration of any 
impairment to be more than six months . . . ”); Neumann v. 
Plastipak Packaging, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-522, 2011 WL 
5360705, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2011) (finding that 
surgery for back and leg pain is “transitory and minor” 
because plaintiff “has not offered any evidence to indicate 
that the actual or expected duration of his surgery 
recuperation was greater than sixth months . . .”).  
63 795 F.3d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2015). 
64 Id. at 707-08; see also Mesa v. City of San Antonio, No. 
SA-17-CV-654-XR, 2018 WL 3946549, at *12, *18 (W.D. 
Tex. Aug. 16, 2018) (explaining that “[t]he regulations and 
EEOC guidance indicate that ‘transitory’ and ‘minor’ are 
separate and distinct requirements” and holding that “[e]ven 
18 
 
intent of the ADA and its implementing regulations, the Court 
treated “transitory” and “minor” as separate and distinct 
inquiries required to meet the “transitory and minor” 
exception to “regarded as” claims.65  
 
assuming that [plaintiff]'s perceived shoulder injury was 
transitory, [defendant] has not conclusively shown that it was 
minor” where the injury required transport to the emergency 
room by ambulance, treatment with prescription pain 
medications, and injury-related work restrictions on climbing, 
reaching, and lifting); Bush v. Donahoe, 964 F. Supp. 2d 401, 
422-23 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (evaluating the treatment and 
symptoms, ability to perform work duties, and restrictions 
and limitations on activity to determine a sprained ankle/foot 
is objectively minor because, although a sprained ankle/foot 
requiring a walking cast is transitory because it heals in less 
than six months, “[t]hat does not end the inquiry. . . . as 
Defendant must also show that [plaintiff’s] impairment was 
minor.”); Davis v. Vermont, Dep’t of Corr., 868 F. Supp. 2d 
313, 327 (D. Vt. 2012) (“In addition, Defendant is unable to 
show from the face of the Second Amended Complaint that 
the impairment was minor. Accordingly, Defendant at this 
stage of the case cannot sustain the defense that the perceived 
impairment is both transitory and minor.”); Mayorga v. 
Alorica, Inc., No. 12-21578-CIV, 2012 WL 3043021, at *9 
(S.D. Fla. July 25, 2012) (declining to dismiss plaintiff’s 
claim based on pregnancy complications as “transitory and 
minor” because whether the impairment “was ‘minor’ 
presents a . . . question of fact that is not properly resolved on 
a motion to dismiss. It cannot be determined from the face of 
the Complaint, nor the record as it currently stands, whether 
[plaintiff]’s impairment was minor.”). 
65 Silk, 795 F.3d at 706-07.  
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Here, especially at the pleading stage, Eshleman’s 
allegations, which are premised not only on the lung surgery 
but also on a close-in-time subsequent ailment affecting the 




For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse District 
Court’s judgment dismissing Eshleman’s regarded as claim 
under the ADA and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.  
